We consider a population with n males and n females, in which individuals marry either monogamously (M) or polygamously (P). We use w ≥ 1 to denote the number of wives for males and h ≥ 1 the number of husbands for females; males and females marry with probabilities Ω and Φ , respectively, which are derived below.
δ, with δ = δ m + δ f = 1 for the offspring of a monogamous couple in a monogamous population in which all males transfer vertically. The fitness of each sibling pair is given by δ z , with z > 0. δ B and δ F denote the resources inherited by sibling pairs B and F , respectively ( Figure 1 in the text).
The probability p that a male is the biological father of his wife's offspring depends on the behaviour of females. Females give their husbands either "high" paternity p H (H) or "low" paternity p L (L), with 0 < p L < p H ≤ 1. Females obtain an additional generic advantage α from mating with other males beyond their husbands; for example, α may represent genetic benefits which lead to increased offspring survival or resource benefits such as nuptial gifts (Reynolds 1996; Kokko 1999) . We assume that α L > α H , and α H = 0 for p H = 1. For simplicity, we further assume that 0 < α < 1/2, such that its fitness value is small relative to the value of the resources transferred to the offspring generation, and does not affect the amount of resources males transfer to their wives' or sister's offspring.
Both males and females know their spouses' marriage strategy. The transfer strategy of males may be conditional upon the marriage and paternity strategies of females. A "suspicious" male (S) transfers vertically if his wives are monogamous and provide paternity p H , diagonally otherwise. An "ingenuous" male (I) transfers diagonally if his wives are monogamous and provide paternity p H , vertically otherwise. These strategies require that males have cues about paternity (e.g. Kokko 1999) : in humans, these include direct phenotypic cues or indirect behavioural cues (e.g. the conformity of females to cultural norms regulating their sexual behaviour). The paternity strategy of females may be conditional only upon the marriage strategy of males. An "astute" female (A) provides paternity p H if her husbands marry monogamously, p L otherwise. A "naive" female (N) provides paternity p L if her husbands marry monogamously, p H otherwise. Table S1 presents a summary of the strategies included in the game. We use XY to denote the marriage strategy X and transfer strategy Y for a male, XZ to denote the marriage strategy X and paternity strategy Z for a female, and (XY, XZ) to denote a pair of male and female strategies. For example, (MV, MH) represents the interaction of a monogamous male who transfers vertically, MV, with a monogamous female who always provides "high" paternity, MH. Table S2 presents a summary of all the symbols used in the model. 
Marriage probabilities
For simplicity, we assume that polygamous individuals either marry w or h spouses, or do not marry at all. Denoting m M and m P the frequencies of monogamous and polygynous males in the population, and f M and f P the frequencies of monogamous and polyandrous females, a focal monogamous male marries with probability
This is derived as follows:
• in a population of monogamous females and monogamous males there are n females, each requiring one husband, and n males, each requiring one wife; thus, the focal male marries with probability Ω M = 1;
• in a population of monogamous females and polygynous males there are n females, each requiring one husband, n − 1 resident polygynous males, each requiring w wives, and the focal monogamous male, requiring one wife; thus, the focal male marries with probability
• in a population of polyandrous females and monogamous males there are n females, each requiring h husbands, and n males, each requiring one wife; thus, the focal male marries with probability Ω M = 1;
• in a population of polyandrous females and polygynous males there are n females, each requiring h husbands, n − 1 resident polygynous males, each requiring w wives, and the focal monogamous male, requiring one wife; thus, the focal male marries with probability
if the number of potential wives is smaller than the number of wives required, i.e. if nh/[(n − 1)w + 1] ≤ 1, or with probability Ω M = 1 if the number of potential wives is greater than the number of wives required, i.e. if nh/[(n − 1)w + 1] ≥ 1.
By similar reasoning, a focal polygynous male marries with probability
Assuming that n is large relative to h and w, Ω M and Ω P simplify to
The probability of marrying for females is derived by analogous reasoning. Assuming that n is large relative to h and w, a focal female marries with probability
Inclusive fitness payoffs
We use˚to indicate any attribute that may depend on the relevant strategy for the focal individual, such that its value may differ from the corresponding value for the resident population.
For example,ẘ denotes the number of wives for a focal male M, withẘ = w for a mutant focal male whose marriage strategy differs from the strategy of resident males, andẘ = w in all other cases. With reference to Figure 1 in the text, the inclusive fitness payoff for a focal male M can be written as 
where β i represents resources inherited by the offspring B of her brother's w ≥ 1 wives and φ i represents resources inherited by her offspring F ; as in the previous case, the subscript i = 1, . . . , 4 denotes the pathway through which resources are transferred to the heir. r FB and r FF represent the coefficients of relatedness between F and, respectively, B and F , as derived below.α = α for a mutant focal female whose paternity strategy differs from the strategy of resident females, andα = α in all other cases.
As in the previous case, β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , and β 4 are only relevant if M marries, while φ 4 is only relevant if F marries. In this case, F's husbands transfer vertically with probabilitym V because the transfer strategy of males may depend on the marriage and paternity strategies of females (males XS and XI, Table S1 ). If this is the case,m V = m V for a mutant focal female whose marriage and/or paternity strategy differs from the strategy of resident females.m V = m V in all other cases.
Coefficients of relatedness
For simplicity, we assume that the biological fathers of the offspring of a promiscuous female are not related, and that the h husbands of a polyandrous female are not related and have equal probability of fathering her offspring. Under these assumptions, and assuming that p in the parent generation is equal to p in the previous generation, a female is related to her offspring by 1/2, a male to his wife's offspring by an average of p/2h, and siblings by an average of ( r MB must accommodate the fact that the paternity strategy of females may depend on the marriage strategy of males (females XA and XN, Table S1 ). If this is the case,p = p for a mutant focal male whose marriage strategy differs from the strategy of resident males.p = p in all other cases. Because a female's h husbands have equal probability of fathering her offspring, the coefficient of relatedness between a focal male M and his wife's offspring B is affected both by the paternity strategy his wife plays against him, and by the paternity strategy she plays against her other h − 1 husbands. This can be written as
which reduces to p/2h forp = p.
Stability of social monogamy
The possible combinations of male and female strategies differ in inclusive fitness payoffs; given these payoffs, we can derive evolutionarily stable equilibria consisting of pairs of male and female strategies that cannot be invaded by rare mutants playing alternative strategies (Maynard Smith 1982) . The software Mathematica (Wolfram Research, Inc. 2007) was used to perform the numerical analysis and to produce the stability plots.
Only two pairs of pure stable strategies result in social monogamy: (MS, MH) and (MS, MA). Because the model does not yield simple analytical solutions, we describe in detail the analytical results for the simplest case, p H = 1; these are plotted in Figure 2 in the text. Figure   S1 shows graphical results obtained with numerical methods for p H = 0.5.
Stability of (MS, MH)
In the first scenario, (MS, MH), resident males are monogamous and suspicious, that is, they transfer vertically if females are monogamous and provide "high" paternity, diagonally otherwise. Resident females are monogamous and always provide "high" paternity. This combination of male and female strategies results in monogamous marriage, vertical transfer, and "high" paternity (Table S1 ). Figure S1: Stability of "suspicious" monogamous males against mutant males with w P = 2, w P = 4, or w P = 8, for p H = 0.5; w P denotes the number of wives for polygynous males, and p H the paternity level of males with females who always provide "high" paternity and of monogamous males with "astute" females. (2δ m + δ f + w P δ f ) z < 3 against males PD and PI,
where w P > 1 denotes the number of wives for a polygynous male.
These conditions are derived by comparing the inclusive fitness payoff for a resident male to the payoff for mutant males. The payoff for a resident focal male M is given by the resources and δ F = 1, the inclusive fitness value of these resources is not affected by z (i.e. δ z B = 1 and δ z F = 1).
The payoff for a mutant focal male M who is monogamous and transfers diagonally (males MD and MI in this population, Table S1 ) is given by the resources φ 1 = δ m + δ f = 1 he transfers to F , and by the resources φ 4 = δ m + δ f = 1 male A transfers to F (Figure 1 in the text).
Thus, δ B = 0, while δ F = 2δ m + 2δ f = 2, with inclusive fitness value for M (2δ m + 2δ f ) z (1/4).
Note that δ z F > 2 for z > 1, that is, values of z > 1 result in a greater than twofold increase in fitness for F . Condition (1a) specifies that vertical transfer can be advantageous where the benefit to a mutant male of providing extra resources to his sister's offspring is offset by their lower relatedness relative to wife's offspring (i.e. for z < log 3/ log 2).
The payoff for a mutant focal male M who is polygynous and transfers vertically (males PV and PS in this population, Table S1 ) is given by the resources β 1 = (δ m + w P δ f )/w P he transfers to each B , and by the resources φ 4 = δ m + δ f = 1 male A transfers to F (Figure 1 in the text). Thus, δ B = (δ m + w P δ f )/w P and δ F = δ m + δ f = 1, with inclusive fitness value for M w P [(δ m + w P δ f )/w P ] z (1/2) and (δ m + δ f ) z (1/4), respectively. Note that δ B < 1 if M contributes at least part of the resources transferred to the next generation (i.e. if δ m > 0), thus δ z B < 1 for z > 1, that is, values of z > 1 result in a reduction of the fitness value of the resources.
Condition (1b) specifies that monogamous marriage can be advantageous if the fitness value of resources is depleted through division (i.e. for δ m > 0 if z > 1), and becomes increasingly advantageous as each female provides a relatively smaller share of the resources inherited by her offspring (i.e. as δ m increases and/or w P decreases).
Finally, the payoff for a mutant focal male M who is polygynous and transfers diagonally (males PD and PI in this population, Table S1) is given by the resources φ 1 = δ m + w P δ f ≥ 1 he transfers to F , and by the resources φ 4 = δ m + δ f = 1 male A transfers to F (Figure 1 in the text). Thus, δ B = 0, while δ F = 2δ m + δ f (w P + 1) ≥ 2, with inclusive fitness value for M [2δ m + δ f (w P + 1)] z (1/4). Note that, as for (1a), δ z F > 2 for z > 1, that is, values of z > 1 result in a greater than twofold increase in fitness for F . Condition (1c) specifies that vertical transfer can be advantageous where the benefit to a mutant male of providing extra resources to his sister's offspring is offset by their lower relatedness relative to wife's offspring; additionally, it becomes increasingly advantageous as each female provides a relatively smaller share of the resources inherited by her offspring (i.e. as δ m increases and/or w P decreases). Condition (1c) reduces to (1a) for δ m = 1.
For p H = 1, the payoff for females MH includes the fitness contribution by their offspring and the fitness contribution by their brother's wife's offspring. Because resident males are suspicious, this is always greater than the payoff for mutant females who are polyandrous and/or provide "low" paternity (females XL, XN, PH, and PA in this population, Table S1 ), which is limited to the fitness contribution by their brother's wife's offspring (and possibly α L ).
Thus, (MS, MH) is stable for values of δ m and z for which conditions (1a) to (1c) are satisfied simultaneously (Figure 2a in the text). The upper limit to the range of values of z is given by condition (1c), marked c in Figure 2a , and the lower limit by condition (1b), marked b in Figure   2a ; condition (1a), marked a in Figure 2a , is always satisfied where (1c) is satisfied.
Stability of (MS, MA)
In the second scenario, (MS, MA), resident males are monogamous and suspicious, that is, they transfer vertically if females are monogamous and provide "high" paternity, diagonally otherwise. Resident females are monogamous and astute, that is, they provide "high" paternity if males are monogamous, "low" paternity otherwise. As for (MS, MH), this combination of male and female strategies results in monogamous marriage, vertical transfer, and "high" paternity (Table S1) 
As in the previous case, these conditions are derived by comparing the inclusive fitness payoff for a resident male to the payoff for mutant males. The inclusive fitness payoff for a resident focal male M is identical to the payoff derived for the previous scenario.
Condition (2a) is the condition for the stability of resident males MS against invasion by mutant males who are monogamous and transfer diagonally (males MD and MI in this population, Table S1 ), and is identical to (1a).
As for (1b), the payoff for a mutant focal male M who is polygynous and transfers vertically (males PV and PI in this population, Table S1 ) is given by the resources β 1 = (δ m +w P δ f )/w P he transfers to each B , and by the resources φ 4 = δ m +δ f = 1 male A transfers to F (Figure 1 in the text). Thus, δ B = (δ m + w P δ f )/w P and δ F = δ m + δ f = 1; because in this case resident females give polygynous males paternity p L , these resources have inclusive fitness value for M w P [(δ m + w P δ f )/w P ] z (p L /2) and (δ m + δ f ) z (1/4), respectively. As for (1b), δ B < 1 if M contributes at least part of the resources transferred to the next generation (i.e. if δ m > 0), thus δ z B < 1 for z > 1, that is, values of z > 1 result in a reduction of the fitness value of the resources. However, because of the reduction in relatedness between polygynous males and their wives' offspring, condition (2b) specifies that monogamy can be advantageous irrespective of whether the fitness value of resources is depleted through division (i.e. for z > 0). As for (1b), monogamy becomes increasingly advantageous as each female provides a relatively smaller share of the resources inherited by her offspring (i.e. as δ m increases and/or w P decreases). Additionally, monogamy becomes increasingly advantageous as the relatedness between a polygynous male and his wives' offspring decreases (i.e. as p L decreases); for p L < 1/w P , any potential fitness benefit to polygyny is offset by the reduction in relatedness to wives' offspring, such that monogamy is stable for all values of δ m .
Finally, condition (2c) is the condition for stability against mutant males who are polygynous and transfer diagonally (males PD and PS in this population, Table S1 ), and is identical to (1c).
For p H = 1, the payoff for females MA is always greater than the payoff for mutant females who are polyandrous and/or provide "low" paternity (females XL, XN, PH, and PA in this population, Table S1 ): as in the previous scenario, the former includes the fitness contribution by own offspring and brother's wife's offspring, while the latter is limited to the fitness contribution by brother's wife's offspring (and possibly α L ).
Thus, (MS, MA) is stable for values of δ m , z, and p L for which conditions (2a) to (2c) are
